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Narrative, Social Identity and Practical Reason:
On Charles Taylor and Moral Theology

T

Mark Ryan

what we as moral theologians can learn from Charles Taylor, particularly his work on
the modern self and the conditions surrounding belief in the
modern, secular age.1 In recent work, Taylor has gone further
than before in bringing into play his own Christian faith, making an
intra-Christian dialogue with him possible. There is an opening here
for drawing out some of the implications of his arguments for moral
theology.
Taylor would seem to offer rich ground to the work of the Catholic
moral theologian, insofar as he resists naturalist accounts of human
action and explores the role theism might play in negotiating the conflicts of the western identity. Taylor’s work may also be taken as resembling what moral theologians do, insofar as he often describes it
as “practical reasoning.” Running through his descriptive analyses of
periods of Western history, his engagement with social science, and
his criticism of contemporary moral theory, one finds the basic questions, “What is the good human beings seek?” “Where does human
flourishing lie?” and “How is this good embodied in societies?” We
might refer to this as the basic anthropological center of Taylor’s
work, as it has developed over the years.2
Further, though it is in large part about a historical and descriptive
study of the conditions of religious belief, together with the emergence
of secularism, across the last 500 years, the argument of Taylor’s A
Secular Age (2007) leads toward the problem of what it means to be a
Christian in our day.3 Here Taylor comes quite close to the preoccupation of moral theologians, insofar as we aspire to help Christians to
go on, practically, in the concrete circumstances of life. Yet there are
also indications that what Taylor offers here will be inadequate for our
task, or at least leave us with many important questions yet to be answered.
1

HIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO DISCERN

Charles Taylor, Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 1992).
2 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 1.
3 Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007), 728-72.
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I believe the reaction of one astute Catholic reader of Taylor gives
expression to the problem I am signaling. Peter Steinfels, after following him through several hundred pages on the contemporary predicament of religious believers, reports feeling deflated by Taylor’s practical suggestions regarding where to go from here.4 Taylor’s examples
of significant Christians who confront the conditions he has traced are
drawn from a set of creative elites or “religious virtuosi” (Peguy, Maritain, Hopkins). What hope or guidance is held out for the typical suburban parish? This frustration, I think, responds to the somewhat ethereal quality of Taylor’s tour de force through history as he makes his
argument.
In short, Taylor’s work has many attractions for moral theologians
today, but there are also some warning signs. Could Taylor’s work
turn out to be a temptation for us? I will explore that question through
the essay and offer a conclusion.
The paper has three parts. The first part recapitulates and examines
Taylor’s narrative in A Secular Age in order to both clarify what
“moral anthropology” and “practical reason” mean for Taylor and enable us to see what a “theological anthropology” (or, going on in our
times as a Christian) would look like for Taylor. Part two presents
Jewish philosopher Martin Kavka’s response to Taylor. Kavka shows
why the anthropology that Taylor employs in A Secular Age makes it
easy for him to neglect to include the Jews in his grand narrative, and
he provides a glimpse of the Jewish way of going on in secular times.
Part three elucidates, beginning with a response to Kavka’s criticisms
of him, a recommended disposition (i.e., wariness) for moral theologians toward Taylor’s work.
THE STORY: PRACTICAL REASON, HISTORY
AND THE AGE OF AUTHENTICITY
Taylor’s narrative account of the modern identity and the modern
age is not typical history; it combines moral anthropology and narrative.5 Like the moral theologian, he is concerned about the agent’s perspective. He seeks, that is, to uncover the moral motivations and sensibilities of human agents that underlie human history, allowing historical events to be intelligible to us, while at the same time providing
at least one of the “causes” (i.e., moral agency) of these events. He

4

Peter Steinfels, “Modernity and Belief,” Commonweal (May 5, 2008).
Indeed, Taylor’s blending of the empirical and the normative has drawn criticism
from historians. See Jonathan Sheehan, “When Was Disenchantment? History and the
Secular Age,” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,
2010), 217-42. Here, I should also note that in what follows I read A Secular Age as
in continuity with the project of Sources of the Self, and thus go back and forth between them.
5
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speaks of these motivations and sensibilities as “sources”—basic human orientations toward goodness/flourishing.6 So, the first peculiarity of Taylor’s narrative history is that it focuses on the moral sources
of an age—both as these sources ground our identities and as they provide a background of meaning for our shared life.
He further tries to uncover how the sources of one age emerge in
transition from the sources of an earlier age—a transition in which our
self-understandings are gradually transformed. His account of the human agent within society that underlies the Age of Authenticity—the
major dispensation of sources he outlines that is closest to us today—
has its roots in an earlier transition from a “porous” identity to a “buffered” identity. He uses the term porous identity to describe the way in
which the pre-modern agent felt vulnerable (permeable) to an array of
forces, both evil and good, in the surrounding cosmos. The moral life
of the pre-modern agent is a matter of properly negotiating these
forces, or of putting oneself in right relation to the best and highest
among them. In Sources of the Self, Taylor described the porous identity as the kind of identity established by agents for whom the good
was an external source, or a source existing “without.”
In his account of this transition—the “Work of Reform”—Taylor
describes how this vulnerability and permeability are exchanged for a
“buffered self” whose moral sources are increasingly located “within.”
This transition takes us from the medieval into the modern age and it
has many facets. While what has changed is perhaps not clearly expressed until the eighteenth century, many of its reforming motives
can be seen in movements within the church as early as the thirteenth
century.7
Eighteenth century “Providential Deism” describes another important change. It names the period during which the buffered self becomes able to invent the moral sources that make possible a completely “immanent” background of meaning. This background of
meaning, powered by internal sources such as a conception of human
freedom as disengagement from the surrounding cosmos, consists in
the picture of a simply reasonable social order whose purpose is universal benevolence, where benevolence is understood in terms of
providing material welfare. In the wake of the ascendancy of Providential Deism, exclusive humanism and atheism become live options
for the first time.8
6

In A Secular Age, he broadens and makes more complex the notion of a moral source,
familiar from Sources, through that of a “social imaginary.” Taylor, A Secular Age,
171-6.
7 On the side of religion, Taylor emphasizes the Hildebrandine reformation issuing in
a new attempt to lead ordinary lay persons into strict accountability for a life of discipleship to Christ. This was manifested materially in a new requirement of one to one
confession for all church members. A Secular Age, 242-3.
8 Taylor, A Secular Age, 221-69.
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The Age of Authenticity originates in a further transition. The original version of the buffered identity conceived of a person’s worth as
an agent in terms of the powers to control both one’s own bodily life
and one’s own environment by means of self-discipline and instrumental reason. Gradually (here we are entering into the late eighteenth
and on into the nineteenth centuries), symptoms arose of dissatisfaction and loss within some quarters of the buffered age. The loss was
of a sense of meaningful connection to an external order; this in turn
was seen to impoverish our full capacities as agents. The receding of
the God in whom orthodox Christians confessed belief was one form
of this loss. The recognition of this loss spurred a movement, the Romantic Movement, to reconnect the agent to sources of meaningfulness and wholeness. Even so, the moral sources of self-control and
instrumental power over the environment remained grounds of the
buffered agent’s dignity.9 Thus the self of the Age of Authenticity is
best understood as a conception of the agent existing under the “crosspressure” of rival sources: instrumental reason and romantic expressiveness.10
Because of its importance to a critique of Taylor later on, let me
spell out further the nature of the Romantic reaction to the buffered
self of the Enlightenment. To do this, we need to see that the effort of
the cross-pressured self, through diverse strands of romanticism, to
reconnect with nature had the shape of an interior quest. A public order
of meaning fades away with the “porous self;” the buffered age demands that we search for natural depths “within.” These inner depths,
and their sensibilities, become the locus in which a connection to an
external and harmonious nature can be recovered.11 Yet, because of
the resistance of instrumental reason and its fragmenting tendencies,
cross-pressured agents have to work at (re-) integrating these inner
depths so that “the harmony of nature” can resonate within them. The
“agent” of this work of re-integration is creative imagination (genius),
which gives expression to nature and at the same time constitutes our
relatedness to it. (Because in the modern world there is no publically
available conception of nature, only imaginative expression can give
us access to nature.) The history of art in these centuries mirrors this
transition, as a conception of art as mimesis gives way to an emphasis
on idiosyncratic creative vision of the individual artist.12 The agent’s
9

For a clear account of how the neo-Aristotelian account of the human being developed by Romantics such as Herder, was still significantly a modern account, see Taylor’s Hegel, 17-28.
10 While the good of instrumental reason is found in domination over external nature,
that of romantic expressivism is found in a harmony between “internal” and “external”
nature.
11 Taylor, A Secular Age, 313-17.
12 More specifically, the drive to reform and its buffered self interrupt the mimetic
approach and order of meaning on which it depends. This gives rise to an epoch in
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(creative) activity in unveiling nature as a source of meaning—by, in
part, constituting nature as meaningful through expression—is crucial
to the reintegration. To put it simply, the meaning is now to be
achieved by means of an interior quest. Christian creative elites named
by Taylor (such as Gerard Manley Hopkins and Charles Peguy) may
be seen as exemplars along the path of this quest. More to the point,
these latter provide modern examples of Christian “conversion”—that
is, of how a Christian may recover (or discover) her faith in a transcendent source by breaking through the buffered or immanent frame
in a way marked by the cross pressures of authenticity.13
This narrative of sources and their historical transitions is integral
to what Taylor means by “practical reasoning.” What is the good of
human life? For Taylor, the good plays the role of a source which orients us with an identity by mapping out for us and for our communities
what matters most. Who am I? (Who are we?) Practical reasoning consists in articulating and re-articulating the self-source relation in dialogue with others. We are striving to understand human nature and
human fulfillment more clearly, and more clear-sightedly, we seek
such fulfillment. But our identities are historical and communal, so the
way these identities unfold historically is essential to understanding
them (thus, ourselves). Historical perspective, further, gives us the opportunity put in conversation the inherited voices of our pasts and present. Is the conception of identity in the early modern period a gain
over that of the medieval period? In what respects? Is the immanent
frame in which we live open to transcendence, and if so should we opt
for the latter? Practical reason names the ongoing effort to provide
reasoned—in the sense of “oriented to truth”—judgments about such
matters.14

which the artist is called upon to invent new forms that invent and express meaning
at the same time through “subtler languages” that go beyond typical forms. Thus, this
vision of art and the artist is a response to, and shaped by these historical circumstances. See, Taylor, A Secular Age, 352-61.
13 What I think must be challenged here is not Taylor’s attribution of significance to
these figures in itself, but how he fits them into his narrative account of the Christian
predicament. By emphasizing the path they forge through the existential complexities
of modernity, he at the same time downplays the way they have been (e.g. Hopkins)
formed in the life of the church. The importance of this formation is something I will
come back to. I owe this insight in part to Matthew Whelan’s comments on an earlier
version of this essay. Personal Correspondence, June 22, 2012. For a similar argument, see Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, “‘Long Live the Weeds and the Wilderness Yet’: Reflections on A Secular Age,” Modern Theology 26.3 (July 2010), 3557.
14 What would this look like in a concrete case? Taylor provides an illustration of how
his conception of reasoning makes a difference to historical interpretation much later
in the book, A Secular Age, when he applies to the debate around the meaning of
Vatican II. Since we live within histories of transitions—i.e., within the pull of distinct

Narrative, Social Identity, and Practical Reason

33

What does his narrative suggest for how Christians are to go on in
our times? Or, put differently, what would a “theological anthropology” look like for Taylor? Taylor avers that, in light of the history of
sources he has narrated and especially the creation of purely immanent
sources, no believer can hold her faith with the confidence possible in
ages past. We are fated to be aware that faith is not the only possibility
for us. However fervent they may be in it, believers are aware that
their faith has been made “fragile” by the presence of different faiths
or lives lived without faith. Thus, we all live on a secularized or “immanent” landscape. The question of theological anthropology is that
of how we choose to “spin” the sources bequeathed to us. One option
is to read, or spin, the immanent existential frame so as to be “closed”
to transcendence. Alternatively, there is a spin that sees it as “open.”
Taylor’s theological anthropology asks what is signified by spinning
conceptions of fulfillment--Taylor’s approach to practical reason requires close attention to experience.14 Practical reason sometimes takes the form of “ad hominem” argument, as he puts it.
The way we interpret and assess Vatican II, and the changes it generated in Catholicism, can take two (argumentative) forms, Taylor avers. According to the first
form, partisans will line up against each other and take a black/white stance, asking,
“Was Vatican II was good/bad for Catholicism? Was it a gain or a loss?” Debaters
may look at various sides of the council, finding some things positive and some negative. But in the end, it’s either “thumbs up” or “thumbs down.” The statement, “Vatican II was a gain,” must be either true or false. Coming to an absolute verdict drives
the whole approach. For this reason, the context out of which the promoters of the
council acted is of interest only to explain why it pushed them to do wrong, or right.
The second form of argument, which Taylor recommends, approaches Vatican II
in a different spirit. Rather than being driven by the supposed necessity to make a
summary judgment, we can attend to the council as expressing certain insights about
Christian faith. These insights, furthermore, grow out of the experience of particular
Christians of the time who were themselves struggling to respond well to the historical
conditions in which they found themselves. Following this line, we will want to attend
closely to the personal spiritual journey, the “itinerary of faith,” expressed in the lives
of Catholics like Charles Peguy or Henri DeLubac who inspired the council. By “itinerary of faith” Taylor refers to the shape of one person’s quest for authentic Christianity that cannot be loosed from their experience, though it may speak to many others.
And this can only be understood by attending both to the milieu out of which she
thought and acted and to her actions and thoughts themselves.
When we approach practical reasoning this way, we assess an expression of faith
(or, of the council, in this case) not primarily in order to determine whether it gets a
single issue right or wrong. Rather, we take it that “what is at stake is complementary
insights,” each of which “bring[s] a fresh perspective which augments and enriches
our understanding” (752). Taylor’s conception of practical reasoning thus urges a generosity born of the requisite humility to say, “I don’t have all the insights.” Thus,
Taylor writes, “instead of reaching immediately for the weapons of polemic, we might
better listen for a voice which we could never have assumed ourselves, whose tone
might have forever been unknown to us if we hadn’t strained to understand it” (754).
Thus, for Taylor practical reason signifies an open-ended conversation in which we
attend to each other, including our companions from other times, not simply as right
or wrong, but as embodying an insight (of faith, in this case) to which we might otherwise have no access.
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the immanent frame as “porous” to transcendent conceptions of fullness.
A JEWISH CHALLENGE TO TAYLOR
I now turn to Jewish philosopher Martin Kavka and his response
to Taylor’s project in A Secular Age. Kavka interrupts the flow of Taylor’s grand story by pointing to what Taylor leaves out—namely, the
Jews. Going further, he provides a portrait of what is lost by Taylor,
by pointing to concrete resources for how religious persons are to go
on in our times. In the next section, I will suggest that the fates of the
Jews and of Christians are linked in Taylor’s grand narrative.
As we saw above, Taylor’s work is driven by his construction and
revision of a moral and theological anthropology. In this regard, he
has been asking, “What is the good?” and “What is a full human life?”
In his most recent work, he is especially concerned with how religious
belief enters into the answering of these questions. Specifically, in our
secular age, he puts the question in terms of whether the “immanent
frame” of existence which we have developed can be “spun” as open
to “transcendence.” As we also saw, these questions do not pertain
merely to the individual as an atomized “self,” but include the social
imaginary within which flourishing is understood. The basic question
driving Kavka’s rejoinder to A Secular Age is, “What is immanent in
Judaism?”15
Kavka identifies Taylor’s moral anthropology with Taylor’s larger
goal of a reconciling philosophical narrative, and he places A Secular
Age in relation to Taylor’s work as a whole, with particular attention
to its Hegelian roots. As just hinted, there is a social purpose in Taylor’s construction of a moral and theological anthropology. Conflicts
over basic anthropological questions are at the root of a personal and
social identity crisis. In Sources of the Self, Taylor wonders whether
the moral ontologies of the Western mind would any longer be sufficient to support the practical, moral commitments we have made to
such notions as universal human rights and the alleviation of suffering
for all. In A Secular Age, he has his sights set on seemingly intractable
issues of the culture wars, such as homosexuality.
Kavka, therefore, identifies Taylor’s moral anthropology with his
larger goal of personal, social, and metaphysical unity. The history of
moral and spiritual sources Taylor constructs ultimately aims to ameliorate the tensions (the “malaise” as he has previously called it) in

15

Martin Kavka, “What is Immanent in Judaism: Transcending Charles Taylor’s A
Secular Age,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, 40, no. 1 (March 2012): 123-37.
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Western social life, be it in the form of a deeper “politics of recognition,”16 or some other unity in our diversity.17 In A Secular Age, he is
particularly focusing on the conflicts of self-interpretation between religious people and those who proclaim some form of non-belief, each
of which comes in several varieties that don’t always reconcile easily
with one another. He articulates these differences with such anthropological questions as: Are the satisfactions of life, liberty and the satisfaction of ordinary desires enough? Or, does the human heart remain
restless? What might provide unity (reconciliation) between such
groups? His hope is that his history will go deep enough into their
shared genome of moral sources that some commonality might be
found.
Kavka further notes that Taylor’s theological anthropology is
deeply shaped by Taylor’s chastened Hegelianism. Taylor wrote two
substantial books on Hegel early in his career, and the problems engaged there have been enduring for him. To begin, the language of
“immanence” versus “transcendence” resembles Hegelian language
for describing the unfolding of objective Spirit in his dialectic. Kavka
notes that Taylor has always been driven by the twin aims of resisting
behaviorism’s attempt at an “objectivist” explanation of the agent’s
experience and seeking a nuanced universalism that would allow us to
make progress toward recognition and harmony. This project leads to
“a view of history as a perpetual groping after new, better, and fresher
explanatory models.”18
We also find here Hegel’s terminology of “alienation and recognition.” The human desire for self-realization leads inevitably to alienation when the agent fails to find its “particular mode of self-realization
[to] be reflected by nature or by others.”19 Taylor’s re-narration of the
universal (or what I have been calling his theological anthropology),
in other words, hopes to bring us further along the quest of social harmony such that the self’s longing for recognition might be satisfied
(the longing to have one’s sense of identity reflected by nature and by
others). Kavka shows that Taylor’s Hegelianism shapes his theological anthropology. Thus, about Taylor, he writes, “The mediation of
transcendence is described… only in terms of the production of a
frame in which members of a polity can make choices about the good
life.”20

16

Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994).
17 His approach to debate within the church, which I described above, is one form of
this “reconciling of the solitudes.” I think it is in a specific context like this one that
his work may be most helpful to us as moral theologians.
18 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 124
19 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 124
20 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130.
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Kavka goes on to note that these Hegelian categories, and German
idealism more generally, have been unable to cope with the particularity of the Jewish tradition and thus are frequently blind to Jewish
markers. (Indeed, members of the idealist movement often sought to
eradicate the Jewish roots of Christianity.) As Kavka’s title question—
“What is immanent in Judaism?”—hints, Taylor’s anthropology is unsurprisingly ill-suited to cope with Judaism. It is therefore unsurprising that Taylor fails to include the Jews in his narrative.
Indeed, the Hegelian anthropology described above seems destined
to be anxious about the presence of religious difference. When human
desire fixates on the harmony of visions that seems forever out of
reach, it is easy for a kind of tragic longing to set in. This might tempt
one to paper over differences that are in fact rather intractable. Put
differently, Kavka can be seen as calling attention to the ambitious
scope of Taylor’s story. Taylor’s purpose may be to find reconciliation
in Western society’s relation to religion. But do citizens of the North
Atlantic world have a religion? Who is the “we”? Kavka’s point,
again, is that Taylor overlooks the Jews in his narrative. Or rather, he
writes them into another category with inelegant concepts like that of
“Judeo-Christian” traditions.
Taylor cannot but miss the Jews, it seems to Kavka, because the
anthropological frame Taylor employs cannot accommodate, and
would inevitably distort, the ways Jews reason practically and seek
fulfillment. But his point is not only to explain an important gap in
Taylor’s history (indeed a troubling one given Taylor’s aims). He also
aims, in his brief but poignant retrieval of Maimonides’s account of
law, to present the advantages of the rabbinic approach to coping with
the cultural conflicts in our day.
Kavka’s central claim is that, for the Jew, God has always already
mediated himself in law as received and interpreted by Jewish practices. Such law not only relates us to God, but also allows us to take
part in God’s will. “The word is very near to you; it is in your mouth
and in your heart for you to observe” (Deut 30:14). In other words, the
Jewish people together with their Scriptures and reading practices both
discover God’s presence in the world and incarnate that presence. God
has shared himself in what is ordinary and close, law (revealed and
human) and its interpretation.21 According to this Jewish vision, one
does not need to yearn after a good not yet realized (or a Geist not yet
concretized!) to have properly religious vision, or to see the sacred in
21

Interestingly, in their response to Taylor, Hauerwas and Coles have suggested that
Taylor’s use of the terms “immanence” and” transcendence” treats them as general
categories, and thus lacking in “Christological discipline.” “For Christians,” they
write, “immanence first and foremost names that God became man that we might participate in the very life of God…. [T]ranscendence first and foremost is the acknowledgement that death could not hold him.” Hauerwas and Coles, “Long Live the
Weeds,” 350.
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the world. God is present in law. We may struggle to interpret laws,
but, Kavka suggests, such practical work is preferable, to constructing
a new and reconciling common vision of human fullness.
Kavka draws on Maimonides’s account of the relation among
kinds of laws, especially among divine and human laws, to articulate
his own account of how Jews are to reason practically in a secular age
and in societies where they are a minority. For Maimonides, laws are
to be distinguished by focusing on their effects on the person (or community) who obeys them. The whole center of gravity in a discussion
about politics from a Maimonidean perspective shifts from the context, meaning, or “ground” of laws to what laws bring about. Now, it
is certainly the case that Maimonides believed that the two main types
of law—divine and human law—function to bring about different
goods. He held to a hierarchy among the kinds of law, with revealed
law at the top, and even seemed to belittle human laws as the “whim
of the chief.”22 Nevertheless, at least as Kavka reads him, the focus of
Maimonides on the effects of laws as what makes them divine leaves
open to the Jew that a human law may unintentionally bring about the
same effects as revealed law. Thus, the relation of kinds of law, so
understood, leaves open the possibility of overlap among divine and
human laws.
Further, there are, naturally, superior goods (i.e., full human perfection) that flow properly only from revealed law. Yet these goods
are kept by Maimonides somewhat separate from politics, whose aims
are or should be the goods of basic welfare. These latter goods, moreover, are thought by him to be necessary as conditions for pursuing
the superior goods. This, for Kavka, changes the game from Taylor’s.
He writes,
One of the things that conceptualizing the relationship between law
and divinity in a Maimonidean manner implies—again, for us readers
of Maimonides in a secular age—is that members of a polity can differ
completely as to visions of the good life, or to a person’s final aim,
and still find consensus on social and political matters.23

It also represents hope for the culture wars:
When the mediation of transcendence is described, as it is by Taylor,
only in terms of the production of a frame in which members of a
polity can make choices about the good life—choices that, as seen

22
23

Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130
Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130
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earlier, will inevitably come into conflict with others’ choices, producing social instability—the possibility of consensus will recede into
the distance, and the Kulturkampf will perdure.24

In sum, Kavka provides both a persuasive explanation of why Taylor overlooks the Jews in his grand narrative and challenges the anthropology that guides this narrative. Kavka accomplishes the former
when he shows how Taylor adopts Hegelian concepts that make religious difference appear problematic. With regard to the latter, Kavka’s
example provides evidence that Taylor’s theological anthropology,
structured as it is, cannot accommodate Judaism. He has therefore
shown that Taylor’s theological anthropology does not have a unique
claim on the imagination of how to go on as religious persons in a
secular age.
NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND PRACTICAL REASON:
ON CHARLES TAYLOR AND MORAL THEOLOGY
Beginning with what we can learn from Kavka’s criticisms, this
final section explores how moral theologians ought to regard Taylor’s
work in relation to their own. What might we learn from Kavka’s
claim that rabbinic Judaism, a la his appropriation of Maimonides,
does not fit within Taylor’s account of religion in our times? In diagnosing Taylor’s omission of rabbinic Judaism from his narrative,
Kavka highlights (and challenges) Taylor’s anthropological frame, behind which he senses the presence of Hegel. Reading Taylor’s Hegel
reinforces my impression that Kavka is right in intuiting that Taylor
remains captivated by Hegel’s project in important ways.25
Taylor situates Hegel’s project in what he takes to be the fundamental (philosophical) problem of his era. It is an anthropological
problem.26 The birth of modern conceptions of the “subject” gives rise
to two competing views of freedom. There is the freedom of a subject’s power to dominate (objectify) nature, and there is the freedom
of restored harmony between the self and nature. The self, then, lives
in the cross pressures of these two conceptions of freedom, and the
immanent-transcendent dialectic responds to this tension in the self.
24

Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130. Kavka, in other words, is trying to avoid the
contentious way of framing cultural conflict that seems to flow from Taylor’s frame,
such as the following, from A Secular Age:” In our religious lives we are responding
to a transcendent reality. We all have some sense of this, which emerges in our identifying and recognizing some mode of what I have called fullness, and seeking to
attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by exclusive humanists, and others that remain
within the immanent frame [of secularity, naturalism, and Zweckrationalität], are
therefore responding to that transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it” (768).
25 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975).
26 For a contextual account of the problem to which Hegel was responding, see Taylor,
Hegel, 1-50.
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The problem that motivates Hegel is re-articulated by Taylor, but
basically adopted as his own preoccupation. Yet this very problem, an
anthropology so understood, is what generates the project of re-narrating the universal—i.e., the grand teleological arc that can be found in
Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular Age.
To gain or reinforce a critical angle on Taylor in a way sensitized
by our engagement with Kavka, we might contrast Taylor’s Hegelian
approach to different kind of narrative. I have in mind the narrative
undertaken by Gerhard Lohfink in answer to the titular question of his
book, Does God Need the Church?27 It emerges in the course of the
narrative that the story’s author, in an ultimate sense, is God. But the
identity of this God, who is revealed in the narrative, is such as to be
inextricably intertwined with the created world and, in particular, the
lives of a people in whom he is particularly invested. Indeed, God’s
story is importantly the same as that of the people called Israel, as Israel—for the formative portion of the narrative—is striving to become
a people, in the sense of having a strong, common identity. This identity is ordered to the promise and call to be God’s presence in the
world. But the story is in large part a history of that community’s failed
attempts, or hypotheses, regarding the social form that would be fitting
for them to adopt. This story of a people embodies the genre of a
quest.28 In the pattern of failure and new beginning, exile and return,
which is renewed in a decisive way in the incarnation of the Son in
Jesus Christ and in the launching of the journey of the church, God as
the ultimate author is gradually revealed as forgiving and generous; to
say that God is “almighty” means that God has “all the time in the
world” to carry the story to its completion without compelling by force
the people he has gathered as his family.29
Kavka’s concern, as I understand it, is that Taylor’s narrative of
social identity is such that it papers over differences in its eagerness to
arrive at commonality and recognition (amid the politics of identity).
In so doing it displays a willingness to posit a “we” that presumes a
reconciliation not (yet) achieved. I have drawn on Lohfink here to imply that this is not the kind of “we” posited within the story told
through the Scripture and liturgies of the people of God. This “we”
stands in the midst of a story where God is made known as the one
who carries out his purposes at a pace his people can keep. The “we”
27

Gerhard Lohfink’s, Does God Need the Church: Toward a Theology of the People
of God (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999).
28 Lohfink, Does God Need the Church, 106-20. Lohfink draws on the Old Testament
in its historical context to show that Israel’s quest for a social form is inseparable from
its identity as the people through whom God is uniquely present in the world. On the
one hand, the biblical record may not conclusively name the form of God’s people—
for it is as much an account of their failed attempts to live as God’s people, a kind of
series of hypotheses being tested and found wanting (119).
29 Lohfink, Does God Need the Church, 39-49.
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of the people of God is thus schooled in a kind patience, a patience
formed by the acknowledgment that God’s end is both already and not
yet. To say that this narrative is “universal,” or aspires to be, is simply
to say that the God of Israel is the God who created (and redeemed)
all creation in love. But the language of “universal” is perhaps wisely
dropped.
THE CHURCH’S NARRATIVE AND PRACTICAL REASON
Lohfink’s narrative thus responds to Kavka’s concern that Taylor’s
narrative presumes too much. Taylor’s story is told from outside the
practical life of a historical community. With this point made, what
remains to be done is to spell out what all this implies about the disposition Christian ethicists ought to adopt toward Taylor. I will offer
a proposal mainly by explaining the difference Lohfink’s narrative
makes for how moral theologians are to understand their task.
At the outset of this paper, I suggested that Taylor was a philosopher deeply concerned with practical reason. We moral theologians
are likely to feel attracted to him for his great strides in defeating reductive accounts of human behavior, i.e., objectivist (naturalist) explanations. In addition, he has become recently more willing to write
about theological matters, and in a way that puts in play his own religious experiences. Further, the focus on religion in A Secular Age
leads ultimately to the question of how people of faith, Catholic Christians in particular, are to understand their position and possibilities in
a secularized social world. For all these reasons, Taylor therefore
seems like he would be a good dialogue partner for moral theologians.
But citing Steinfels, I also drew attention to how his recommendations with regard to how to go on were lacking in traction. His examples of modern religious persons include people of extraordinary talents, and in discussing them his focus regards their unique itineraries
of faith with little attention to their participation in local churches.
What’s more, with Kavka, I pointed out that Taylor’s anthropological approach is correlative with a narrative that subsumes religious
difference, presuming a “we” that is not (yet) realized. Drawing on
Lohfink, I intimated that Taylor’s form of narration overlooks everyday Christians in the same way it does Jews. I therefore conclude that
Taylor represents a temptation to moral theologians. He is not quite
the friend we may have taken him to be, and therefore we should engage him cautiously.
Why I think Taylor may lead us to distort our basic task as moral
theologians can be spelled out by further explicating how his narrative
contrasts with Lohfink’s. The “we” that functions in relation to the
narrative displayed in Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular
Age—his “big books”—is one that, I will now claim, stands “outside”
the unfolding of the story itself. By contrast, the “we” of Lohfink’s
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story, the people of God, stands “inside” the story. That is to say, it is
the story of an incarnate God.
A natural challenge to my claim would ask whether Taylor’s “we”
is really outside of the unfolding events of his narrative, especially
when he himself is present in the culminating characterization of what
it may mean to be religious in our times. Further, the objection could
be understandably raised that, unlike what is implied in Hegel’s system, Taylor recognizes the basic contingency in the narrative of our
search for the good.
The defense of my claim, and my articulation of how the task of
the moral theologian differs from what Taylor’s narrative might lead
us to expect, comes with returning to my introductory description of
Taylor as a practical reasoner. To begin with, Taylor certainly raises
the question, “What is the nature of the good?” However, his thinking
does not engage the more practical question, “What ought X to do?”
We might say that his thinking is more akin to the theoretical reasoning of synderesis30 than to practical reasoning per se.31 It is the mark
of practical reasoning that it terminates in an action.
As Herbert McCabe has pointed out, it is human for the end which
we intend to be held before us by the intellect, and this is the function
of synderesis, but the virtue of practical reason, prudentia, is fundamentally concerned with how well we bring a will for the good into
the life of action here and now.32 While synderesis provides the terms
or first principles within which such reasoning is carried out, practical
deliberation is not about these terms or principles but about a possible
way forward in action.
Interpreting Aquinas, McCabe goes on to say that prudentia, or
“good sense,” depends more determinatively on the activity of the
bodily senses than the mind. For unlike the relatively straightforward
steps of theoretical logic, to do practical reasoning well requires taking
into account to a wide array of particulars, and what is crucial is the
perception of these. For this, our senses need to be in good shape and
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Whether it is proper to attribute synderesis to theoretical reason rather than practical
reason is a matter I think to be arguable. I have gone with “theoretical” here to emphasize that Taylor’s discussion of practical reason focuses more on the way reason
illuminates the field of action than on discerning steps that lead to a realization of the
good end.
31 I owe this insight to my colleague Brad Kallenberg at the University of Dayton.
32 I am here drawing on what I have learned about Aquinas from Herbert McCabe.
Elucidating Aquinas on these matters, McCabe writes, “The intellectual grasp of the
aim as aim (not attraction to it and intention of it, which is the actualization of will,
but the understanding of it) is synderesis.” Herbert McCabe, “Aquinas on Good
Sense,” New Blackfriars 67, 796 (Oct 1986): 426.
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well-tuned. The grasping of the salient particular is ultimately done by
a bodily gesture such as pointing at it.33
I use this distinction to draw attention to the fact that there is a kind
of theoretical reasoning involved in morality, but it is far from the
whole of what moral reasoning requires. We need a certain illumination of the field, but we need also the ability to reason well as we carry
an intention into action in concrete circumstances. I believe Taylor remains at this speculative level, and this is telling. It correlates well
with the conclusion I drew from my reading of Kavka that Taylor’s
narrative is told from the “outside.”
Adopting something like Lohfink’s narrative and attempting to
identify with the “we” of the people of God, the moral theologian reasons practically from “the inside.” My point is that for those whose
narratives place them on the “inside,” practical reasoning will be more
like what McCabe, following Aquinas, describes it to be. This practical reasoning will be more akin to finding our way through a world of
multifarious particulars with our ultimate end neither fully apparent
nor totally opaque. Here practical reasoning is all about how to go on
in these concrete circumstances, to make the next move. My aim is to
suggest that moral theologians ought to see their task as helping ourselves and other Christians to carry out such reasoning well. Not unlike Kavka’s Jewish reasoners who look for signs of God’s incarnation
in civil laws and seek to revise such laws when they find no such signs,
the moral theologian seeks a way forward in light of what God has
done and promises to do. This reasoning embodies an eschatological
patience, which recognizes that our deliberations and actions, while
consequential, need not bear the burden to ultimately determine their
own meanings.
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McCabe, “Aquinas on Good Sense,” 429-30. We may comment here that this rendition of practical reasoning, drawing on McCabe’s discussion of Aquinas’s prudentia, implies a bodily formation if it is to be done well. Thus, Hauerwas and Coles
have challenged Taylor’s portrait of Gerard Manley Hopkins as a modern convert on
the grounds that he disassociates Hopkins’s poetic imagination from his liturgical life.
While Taylor praises poets like Hopkins for enlarging our capacities of being, he does
not attend to the way Hopkins’s poetry is shaped by life of daily prayer and worship.
The narrow conception of language implied here runs against the grain of Taylor’s
better insights. This, in my terms, is evidence that Taylor’s account of the possibilities
for being religious in our day is shaped by his Hegelian anthropology. Hauerwas and
Coles, “Long Live the Weeds,” 352.

